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THE DARK SIDE OF CONSENSUS AND 
CREATIVITY:  WHAT MEDIATORS OF MASS 
DISPUTES NEED TO KNOW ABOUT AGENCY 
RISKS 
Howard M. Erichson* 
INTRODUCTION 
Mass disputes often require a skilled mediator to help parties arrive at a 
resolution.  The importance of settlement in general, the importance of 
collective settlement in particular, and the difficulty of achieving complex 
settlements without facilitation all point toward the need for mediators.  
Justice in mass disputes often requires negotiated resolutions to soften the 
hard edges of all-or-nothing adjudications.  And justice in mass disputes 
demands collective processes to level the field between numerous claimants 
and a defendant or group of defendants.  Given the difficulty of resolving 
disputes with many competing interests, skilled facilitation by a mediator 
may be essential to arrive at a sound outcome. 
But without careful attention to agency risks, mediators may inadvertently 
become part of the problem rather than part of the solution.  By looking for 
aligned interests among those at the negotiating table, and by empowering 
lawyer-negotiators who speak on behalf of large groups of claimants, 
mediators may exacerbate agency risks and undermine claimants’ access to 
justice. 
This Essay looks at how mediators describe their role, and it asks 
whether—in negotiations to resolve mass disputes—the mindset and skill set 
of mediators may sometimes exacerbate rather than mitigate risks of self-
serving conduct by lawyers.  The Essay applies general concerns about class 
settlements and nonclass settlements to the particular problem of mass 
dispute mediation.  The term mass disputes, for purposes of this Essay, refers 
both to class actions and to nonclass mass litigation.  In mass disputes, large 
numbers of claimants—consumers, employees, citizens, municipalities, 
merchants, or others—assert factually related claims against a defendant or 
 
*  Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.  This Essay was prepared for the 
Symposium entitled Achieving Access to Justice Through ADR:  Fact or Fiction?, hosted by 
the Fordham Law Review, Fordham Law School’s Conflict Resolution and ADR Program, 
and the National Center for Access to Justice on November 1, 2019, at Fordham University 
School of Law.  Thanks to the Fordham Law Review for hosting this Symposium on access to 
justice and alternative dispute resolution, and thanks to Samara Perlman for helpful research 
assistance. 
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group of defendants.  The term includes not only enormous disputes but also 
multiclaimant disputes that are merely big; they may involve millions of 
claimants or merely hundreds.  For purposes of this Essay, what is essential 
to the definition of mass dispute is that each claimant, as a practical matter, 
lacks meaningful control over the handling of the claim and, especially, lacks 
meaningful control over the settlement negotiation process, which is largely 
controlled on the claimants’ side by a lead lawyer or group of lead lawyers. 
The starting point is to be clear about the value of mediated collective 
settlements as a way to resolve mass disputes.  While this Essay raises 
concerns that mediators’ mindsets and skill sets may work to the 
disadvantage of claimants in mass disputes, it should not be taken as 
dismissive of the importance of settlement in general, of collective settlement 
in particular, or of mediation to facilitate the negotiation of satisfactory 
resolutions and thus to help parties achieve justice through mass collective 
settlements.  Rather, it should be taken as a cautionary exploration of risks 
that mediators should keep in mind.  The best answer to the concerns raised 
in this Essay is a mediator armed with clarity about these risks. 
I.  WHAT DO MEDIATORS BRING TO THE ROOM? 
What, in general, makes mediators valuable?  Mediators bring a set of 
skills and values that help negotiating parties resolve their disputes.  Skilled 
mediators establish rapport and earn the confidence of the negotiating parties.  
They bring creativity in thinking about solutions, and they are open to the 
creative ideas brought by the negotiating parties.  Above all, they find 
overlapping interests among the negotiating parties to help the negotiating 
parties achieve consensus. 
JAMS, a leading alternative dispute resolution provider, markets its 
mediation services by saying that “JAMS neutrals are on the case long before 
the day of mediation and don’t consider their job done until settlement is 
achieved.”1  It says that its mediators achieve the goal of settlement by 
establishing rapport and pursuing creative solutions that bring parties 
together: 
Using their extraordinary interpersonal skills, JAMS mediators listen 
closely to all perspectives, quickly evaluate party dynamics and establish 
rapport, leaving ample time for them to focus on . . . pursuing creative, 
 
 1. The JAMS Mediation Process, JAMS, https://www.jamsadr.com/mediation 
[https://perma.cc/6PVH-LGFM] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020).  On achievement of settlement 
as the measure of success, see Ava J. Abramowitz, Toward a Definition of Success in 
Mediation, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 2018, at 23, 24 (“We know intuitively that if the 
parties leave the table angrier than when they sat down and with no settlement in hand, the 
mediation was a failure.  On the flip side, we know that if the parties come to an agreement, 
successfully implement that agreement, and feel that the mediator was ‘fair,’ we have a 
success.”) and Alexander Oddy, What Is the Definition of Success in Mediation?, WOLTERS 
KLUWER:  KLUWER MEDIATION BLOG (Dec. 1, 2011), 
http://mediationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2011/12/01/what-is-the-definition-of-success-in-
mediation-2/ [https://perma.cc/3292-N2BM] (“If mediation leads to settlement on the day then 
it has plainly succeeded on any view.”). 
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collaborative solutions that are consistent with the facts of the case and 
geared toward preserving mutual interests and ongoing relationships.2 
Other mediators similarly emphasize the importance of establishing trust 
and rapport.3  Legendary mass dispute mediator Francis McGovern, speaking 
about two other legendary mass dispute mediators—Kenneth Feinberg and 
Eric Green—described trust as the key factor:  “[T]he word that comes to 
mind for me is ‘trust.’  That is to say, what Ken can do and what Eric can do 
is create trust on the part of all of the parties, all of the factors, and all of the 
people involved.”4 
In addition to the importance of establishing rapport and trust, mediators 
emphasize the importance of creativity and openness to new solutions.  
Feinberg once described it this way:  “You also need doggedness, flexibility 
and creativity.  I often say, ‘There’s always more than one way to get to 
“yes.”’  I’m always looking for a different way to get the parties to recognize 
that compromise can be reached.”5  Further, he explained, “I think what I try 
to bring is an enthusiasm and a doggedness.  And like Francis says, creativity 
to try to get everybody to yes.”6 
Mediators use rapport and creativity in the service of helping the 
negotiating parties reach a consensus.  The project of reaching consensus, to 
a large extent, depends on finding overlapping interests.  “What you’re trying 
to do with settlement,” McGovern explains, “is move up in the ‘Northeast 
quadrant’ to try to satisfy each side as much as possible for the various issues 
that they consider the most important.”7  Feinberg puts it this way: 
The ability of the neutral . . . in getting all of the various players . . . to buy 
into the process gets to the point of innovation.  It is the skill of the neutral, 
hopefully with the help of a judge or at least with the acquiescence of a 
judge, to convince all of the interested parties that it is in their parochial 
 
 2. Id. 
 3. See, e.g., Stephen B. Goldberg, Mediators Reveal Their Essential Techniques for 
Successful Settlements, ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG., May 2006, at 81, 81 (“If the 
mediator is unable to develop rapport, it matters little how proficient the mediator is with the 
many tactics that are espoused in the mediation literature and taught in mediator training—
success in bringing disputing parties to a resolution of their dispute is unlikely.  This 
conclusion emanates from surveying experienced mediators on how they accounted for their 
successes.  The overwhelming response given by more than 75% of the respondents was that 
the key element in successful mediation is developing rapport with the parties.”). 
 4. A Facilities Roundtable:  Feinberg, Green and McGovern Analyze Their Own 
Approaches to Intractable Disputes, ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG., Sept. 2019, at 113, 
126 [hereinafter Roundtable]. 
 5. Tom Fox, How to Be a Good Mediator, WASH. POST (Nov. 28, 2012), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/on-leadership/how-to-be-a-good-mediator/2012/ 
11/28/8e834602-3974-11e2-8a97-363b0f9a0ab3_story.html [https://perma.cc/9CKW-NE4T] 
(interviewing Kenneth Feinberg). 
 6. Roundtable, supra note 4, at 126. 
 7. Id. at 123. 
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interest to be as creative in coming up with some sort of global remedy that, 
to me, defines the success of the neutral.8 
As described by these mediators, the mediation process helps parties arrive 
at a resolution by generating a spirit of trust, cooperation, and creativity in 
finding mutually satisfactory terms. 
II.  WHO IS IN THE ROOM? 
These skills and values allow mediators to help negotiating parties reach 
resolutions.  They allow mediators to bring the room to a consensus.  But 
who is in the room where it happens?9  When a mediator helps the negotiating 
parties find creative solutions and thereby reach a consensus, who are the 
negotiating parties?  Not the millions of claimants in a massive class action.  
Not the 50,000 claimants in a mega–mass tort dispute.  Not even the three 
hundred claimants in a merely big multiplaintiff litigation.  Rather, those in 
the room, along with the defendants’ representatives and the mediator, are 
likely the lead lawyers appointed (or self-appointed) to negotiate on behalf 
of the mass of claimants.10  Depending on the dispute, these might be 
claimants’ counsel, multidistrict litigation (MDL) leadership counsel, class 
counsel, interim class counsel, or putative class counsel. 
Note that the reality of mass settlement negotiations does not correspond 
with the unthinking language courts and the media often use to describe them.  
When announcing or recounting mass settlement deals and the negotiating 
processes that led to them, judicial opinions and media accounts often state 
that “the parties” negotiated in such and such a way and that “the parties” 
agreed to such and such terms.  In reality, the parties did no such thing.  
While, in light of the control many large defendants exercise over their 
lawyers, one might reasonably say that defendants negotiated and agreed to 
certain terms, one cannot say that claimants in mass disputes exercise the 
same sort of participation and control.  Thus, rather than say that “the parties” 
negotiated a deal, it would usually be more accurate to say that a defendant 
 
 8. Id. at 124.  In the same roundtable discussion, Eric Green explained where creative 
ideas come from:  “So I think you get a lot of these great ideas that can be put into play from 
the parties, the lawyers, the judge, colleagues, and others.” Id. at 125. 
 9. Cf. LIN-MANUEL MIRANDA, The Room Where It Happens, on HAMILTON:  AN 
AMERICAN MUSICAL (Atl. Records 2015) (expressing Aaron Burr’s frustration at having been 
excluded from the negotiation that resulted in a compromise creating a national bank and 
moving the nation’s capital). 
 10. Indeed, even in nonmass dispute settings, clients cede much control in mediation to 
the attorneys. See Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-
Connected Mediation:  The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 
1, 4–5 (2001) (“The parties are still responsible for making the final decision regarding 
settlement, but they are cast in the role of consumers, largely limited to selecting from among 
the settlement options developed by their attorneys.  Indeed, it is the parties’ attorneys, often 
aided by mediators who are also attorneys who assume responsibility for actively and directly 
participating in the mediation process, invoking the substantive (i.e., legal) norms to be applied 
and creating settlement options.”). 
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negotiated the deal with claimants’ counsel or a subset of claimants’ 
counsel.11 
In a mass settlement negotiation, where do interests overlap among those 
who are actually at the negotiating table?  In particular, what interests do 
defendants share with claimants’ negotiating counsel?  Incentives matter.  
Even if attorneys imagine themselves immune from anything that would 
interfere with perfectly loyal representation to clients, it would be naïve to 
think that attorney incentives, particularly fee incentives, disappear when 
attorneys negotiate settlements.  Moreover, the diffusion of client interests 
and lack of client control in mass representation leaves mass disputes 
particularly vulnerable to settlements driven by lawyer interests.  Thus, this 
invites the question:  in what ways do the interests of claimants’ negotiating 
counsel in mass disputes converge with the interests of defendants? 
First, they share an interest in closure.  In the class action setting, this may 
mean expanding the class definition to give the defendant more protection 
from liability at low cost to the defendant.12  For a defendant, a broader class 
definition means that more class members are bound by the settlement, and 
therefore fewer persons have claims they can assert against the defendant in 
the future.  For class counsel or putative class counsel, a broader class 
definition expands the size of the franchise; it represents pure upside.  An 
expanded class definition brings claimants into the deal who otherwise were 
not represented by this particular lawyer.  Even if the added class members 
get little or no real benefit, the expanded definition benefits the negotiating 
lawyer by making the defendant more willing to agree, potentially bringing 
a few more dollars into the total deal, and potentially expanding the class 
counsel’s fee. 
Similarly, in the nonclass setting, claimants’ negotiating counsel and 
defendants share an interest in closure.  In nonclass aggregate settlements, 
defendants often prefer deals that are as comprehensive as possible to protect 
the defendant from facing future claims.13  Defendants thus benefit from 
high-pressure tactics to force claimants to participate in a deal.  For example, 
defendants may prefer a term that requires claimants’ counsel to inform 
clients that the lawyer will withdraw from representing any claimant who 
declines to participate in the settlement.  Just as defendants benefit from 
maximizing claimant participation, so do claimants’ lawyers.  Maximum 
settlement participation allows claimants’ counsel to earn fees and move on 
to other work.  Moreover, mass settlements often are negotiated by lawyers 
who do not represent all of the claimants in litigation, such as lead negotiating 
lawyers among leadership counsel in an MDL.  For such lawyers, a larger 
deal may mean larger fees from the work on the deal, while the negotiating 
 
 11. See generally ELIZABETH CHAMBLEE BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS:  BACKROOM 
BARGAINING IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION (2019). 
 12. See Howard M. Erichson, Aggregation as Disempowerment:  Red Flags in Class 
Action Settlements, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 859, 893–97 (2016). 
 13. See Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 
CORNELL L. REV. 265, 270–74 (2011); D. Theodore Rave, Closure Provisions in MDL 
Settlements, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2175, 2182 (2017). 
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lawyers would not have the central role in litigating claims on behalf of 
claimants who decline to participate in the settlement. 
Second, claimants’ negotiating counsel share with defendants an interest 
in maximizing the apparent size of the deal, particularly in class actions.  
Specifically, they share an interest in maximizing the ratio of the apparent 
value of the deal to its actual cost to defendants.  For a defendant to get the 
protection from liability that a class settlement provides, the court must 
approve the settlement by finding it “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”14  
Maximizing the apparent value of the deal helps to garner judicial approval.  
Likewise, for class counsel to earn fees from a class settlement, they need the 
court to approve the deal and thus share an interest in maximizing the deal’s 
apparent value.  Moreover, class counsel’s fees generally correspond to the 
value of the deal, so the lawyers have an even more direct interest in 
exaggerating the size of the deal.  Thus, when the negotiating parties are the 
defendant and putative class counsel, certain types of provisions may appear 
as win-win options even though they offer little or no value to the class 
members.  For example, cy pres remedies, in which funds go to charitable 
organizations, may expand the apparent but not actual value of a settlement 
for the class members.15  Similarly, settlement terms in the form of coupons, 
vouchers, or credits provide an opportunity for putative class counsel to 
exaggerate the size of a proposed settlement by valuing the term at face value 
rather than real value.16 
Third, there are settlement terms that may seem appealing in mediation 
because one side wants the term and the other side does not object.  That is, 
plaintiffs’ counsel may have little incentive to object to terms favored by 
defendants, and defendants may have little incentive to object to terms 
favored by plaintiffs’ counsel.  Class settlement claims processes that impose 
hurdles for individual class members to assert claims, for example, may 
appeal to defendants by reducing total payouts and may face little objection 
from class counsel if the settlement may plausibly be presented to the court 
as having a high face value.17  Clear sailing agreements, in which defendants 
agree not to object to class counsel’s fee request to the court, appeal to class 
counsel and may face little objection from defendants if such an agreement 
eases the deal.18 
Finally, not only do claimants’ counsel and defendants share certain 
interests, they also share certain disinterests.  If a settlement of a certain total 
dollar amount will achieve closure of a certain scope of claims, neither the 
defendant nor claimants’ counsel necessarily possesses sufficient incentive 
to exercise care in how that total settlement amount gets allocated among the 
claimants.  Again, to be clear, the point is not that one expects lawyers to 
violate their ethical duties.  Lawyers owe ethical duties of loyalty, diligence, 
 
 14. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
 15. See Erichson, supra note 12, at 882–89. 
 16. See id. at 878–82. 
 17. See id. at 889–92. 
 18. See id. at 901–03. 
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and competence to each of the clients they represent.19  One hopes that 
claimants’ lawyers in mass disputes take seriously these obligations as they 
relate to achieving fair compensation for each client based on the strength of 
each client’s claims.  But even as one acknowledges these ethical duties, one 
can recognize that incentives matter.  For the most part, claimants’ lawyers’ 
compensation does not depend upon achieving a careful and fair allocation 
of settlement funds.  Rather, their compensation in mass disputes generally 
depends on, first, getting defendants to agree to settlement terms and, second, 
maximizing the total size—or at least the total apparent size—of the 
settlement that the court will use to determine a class counsel fee or common 
benefit fee. 
III.  MEDIATION AS THREAT AND OPPORTUNITY 
Thus, in various ways, the interests (and disinterests) of defendants facing 
mass liability overlap with the incentives of the lawyers who negotiate on 
behalf of large numbers of claimants.  Without a mediator, this creates a risk 
of settlements that treat claimants unfairly.  The question is whether, with a 
mediator, we should expect things to work out better. 
In light of the significant aligned interests between claimants’ negotiating 
counsel and defendants in mass disputes, and in light of the mindset of 
mediators to build consensus by helping negotiating parties to see 
overlapping interests and to seek creative solutions, a natural question is how 
mediators apply their skills.  Do they help the negotiating “parties”—that is, 
those in the room, which means the claimants’ negotiating counsel and 
representatives for the defendants—get to “yes” with the sort of creative 
solutions that, in too many mass settlements, seem to benefit counsel and 
defendants without providing sufficient benefits for claimants or class 
members?  Or do they provide a check on such impulses? 
Mediation carries an imprimatur of fairness.  Courts routinely treat the 
involvement of a mediator as a signal that all is well with a settlement.20  As 
James Coben explains, citing his research that turned up over two hundred 
such cases, “with increasing frequency, judges assert that the involvement of 
a mediator in class action mediations is proof that the resulting settlements 
were negotiated free of collusion and fraud.”21  The participation of a 
mediator emboldens judges to approve proposed class action settlements and 
to encourage and facilitate nonclass aggregate settlements.  The judge’s 
confidence in the trustworthiness of the mediator as an individual, or the 
judge’s confidence in mediation in general, may translate into trust regarding 
the fairness of the settlement.  But if mediation may facilitate deals that serve 
 
 19. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) 
(competence); id. r. 1.3 (diligence); id. r. 1.7 (conflicts of interest). 
 20. See James R. Coben, Creating a 21st Century Oligarchy:  Judicial Abdication to Class 
Action Mediators, 5 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 162, 162 (2013) (“It is becoming a matter of 
routine for federal and state judges to cite the involvement of a private mediator as evidence 
that bargaining in a class action case was conducted at arms-length and without collusion 
between the parties.”). 
 21. Id. at 168. 
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the aligned interests of plaintiffs’ counsel and defendants, despite the best 
intentions of the mediator, the court’s trust in the fairness of mediated 
outcomes may be misplaced.  The trustworthiness and skills of the mediator 
may not be a reliable signal of the fairness of the settlement. 
In one settlement class action in which objectors raised concerns about 
whether they had been treated fairly, the district judge rejected these concerns 
in part based on the fact that the dispute had been mediated by “an 
experienced mediator who served with honor and distinction”22 as a federal 
district judge for many years: 
In arguing that the parties and their counsel colluded, objectors essentially 
suggest that Judge Bullock was too blind to see collusion at the tip of his 
nose during the mediation, or that Judge Bullock was part of the collusion.  
The court rejects these insulting, baseless arguments accusing the parties, 
class counsel, defense counsel, or Judge Bullock of collusion.  Judge 
Bullock . . . facilitated a two-day intense mediation that resulted in the 
proposed settlement.  If the parties were going to collude or attempt to 
collude, the last person they would have asked to serve as a mediator is 
Judge Bullock.  Judge Bullock is as smart and honorable as the universe is 
large.  He would not and did not participate in a collusive mediation or 
permit one to take place in front of him.23 
The court treated the objectors’ argument as if it were a personal attack on 
the mediator and thus leapt to the defense of the mediator.  This sort of “any 
rejection of an unfair settlement would impugn the integrity of the mediator” 
mentality is dangerous.  When a judge decides whether to approve a class 
settlement, the question is not whether the judge thinks highly of the mediator 
but rather whether the settlement itself treats class members fairly.  Given the 
agency risks in negotiating class and mass settlements, courts must be open 
to the possibility that even with an honorable and experienced mediator, the 
process may produce a settlement that treats absent claimants unfairly.  On 
appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s approval of the 
settlement class action.24  Regarding the district court’s comments about the 
mediation, the court of appeals pointed out the district judge’s flawed 
premise:  “the court appears to have regarded the allegations of collusion as 
an attack on the mediator himself and his integrity and intelligence.”25  
Noting that the mediator did not have all the relevant information about the 
objectors’ concerns, the court of appeals concluded that “the district court 
abused its discretion in rejecting the possibility of collusion based on the 
presence of the mediator.”26 
Regarding the fairness of mass settlements, the word collusion tends to 
obscure more than it reveals.  The issue is rarely the sort of nefarious 
cooperation conjured up by the word collusion; rather, the issue is the 
 
 22. Speaks v. U.S. Tobacco Coop., Inc., 324 F.R.D. 112, 140 (E.D.N.C. 2018), rev’d sub 
nom. Sharp Farms v. Speaks, 917 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Sharp Farms v. Speaks, 917 F.3d 276, 281 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 25. Id. at 291. 
 26. Id. at 292. 
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alignment of interests between class counsel or mass counsel and defendants, 
and the danger that this set of interests may influence some of the settlement 
terms that counsel propose and accept.27  Even so, the Fourth Circuit’s basic 
point is sound:  the participation of a mediator, in itself, does not guarantee 
the fairness of the settlement. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, mediation presents both a threat and an opportunity for access to 
justice in mass disputes.  The complexity of mass settlement negotiations 
makes mediation the norm.  Judges often name mediators in class actions, 
MDLs, and other mass disputes, and mediators frequently play a central role 
in bringing mass disputes to negotiated resolutions.  To the extent mediators 
convert the potential power of aggregation into meaningful relief for 
otherwise powerless claimants, they enhance access to justice.  Even with the 
strength of collective representation, parties may find it impossible to break 
through impasses and see through complexity without the assistance of a 
skilled third-party neutral.  But to the extent mediators exacerbate the agency 
risks in mass settlement negotiations, they stand as a barrier to access to 
justice.  The easiest path to settlement in a mass dispute involves exploiting 
the alignment of interests between plaintiffs’ counsel and defendants.  A 
mediator who is occupationally predisposed to search for overlapping 
interests may encourage negotiators to follow a path to what looks like a 
successful negotiated resolution without fully recognizing that the resolution 
may benefit plaintiffs’ lawyers and defendants more than it benefits the 
plaintiffs themselves. 
The threat is that striving for consensus (among those in the room) and 
embracing creativity (by those in the room) may be precisely what empowers 
negotiating counsel to the detriment of the great mass of claimants.  The 
opportunity is that a mediator may be well positioned to steer settlement 
discussions away from the sort of provisions that mutually benefit class 
counsel or mass counsel and defendants but not the claimants.  The hope that 
drives this Essay is that awareness of this risk will better position mediators 
to embrace the opportunity and suppress the threat. 
 
 27. I have raised this point previously in the context of discussing the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision in Pearson v. NBTY, Inc., 772 F.3d 778 (7th Cir. 2014): 
Importantly, the court did not use the language of collusion.  Rather, it used the 
language of self-interest.  The fruitful question, Judge Posner understood, is not 
whether there was a nefarious conspiracy between the defendant and class counsel.  
Rather, looking at the actual terms of the settlement, the question is whether class 
counsel negotiated in the best interests of the class, as opposed to negotiating a deal 
that would appeal to the defendant, appear satisfactory to an uninquisitive judge, 
and serve class counsel’s self-interest. 
Erichson, supra note 12, at 871; see also Coben, supra note 20, at 164–65 (“The inquiry of 
collusion is concerned both with ‘overt misconduct by the negotiators’ as well as ‘incentives 
for the negotiators to pursue their own self-interest and that of certain class members,’ 
incentives that are ‘implicit in the circumstances and can influence the result of the 
negotiations without any explicit expression or secret cabals.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting 
Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 960 (9th Cir. 2003))). 
